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IMPLICATIONS

In this age of low tariffs and efficient transportation, it is not
unusual to find even the most common businessman engaging in
contracts for goods and services with foreign companies. Many
times services are performed overseas, or goods are shipped to the
United States without any need for the foreign concern to establish
an office or agency within United States borders.
While recognizing no need for the creation of business offices,
many foreign companies and individuals take advantage of the
political and economic stability of the United States by holding
land, establishing bank accounts, extending credit, or investing in
securities. Bank accounts, in particular, serve a dual purposeas a safe depository for the accummulation of wealth, and as a
convenient source of funds for the transaction of business with
United States concerns.
Until Shaffer v. Heitner,I the United States businessman could
be sure that, in the event of a dispute with a foreign company or
individual, he could establish jurisdiction over the foreign defendant merely by effecting a quasi-in-rem attachment of the for1.

433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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eigner's land, securities, debts or bank holdings. Although potential judgment was limited to the value of the attached property,
the simplicity and ease in which quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was obtained outweighed the benefits of securing a judgment in
personam. Whereas InternationalShoe v. Washington' demanded,
for in personam jurisdiction, an uncertain degree of defendantforum contacts such that "fair play and substantial justice ' 3 prevailed, in rem cases since Pennoyer v.Neff4 allowed jurisdiction
based solely upon the forum's power over property. Shaffer v.
Heitner suddenly changed this jurisdictional scheme by holding
that due process required a consideration of defendant's forum
contacts under the InternationalShoe standard before jurisdiction
could be obtained over defendant's property.- Indeed, no longer
can the prospective plaintiff attach property merely because it is
present in the jurisdiction-he must show that defendant's contacts with the forum are sufficient to justify the court's jurisdiction
over defendant's interest in the attached property.'
The plaintiff anticipating suit against a foreign defendant must
study the implications of Shaffer before attempting to secure
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction through the attachment of defendant's
assets. No longer can an American businessman be sure that an
attachment of the foreigner's property will provide jurisdiction.
The presence of a foreigner's assets in this country may be transitory and fortuitous; plaintiff's cause of action will not likely be
related to the property attached. The American plaintiff must ascertain whether the strict guidelines of Shaffer, intended to protect
American defendants, should apply to the quasi-in-rem attachment of a foreign defendant's property.
Shaffer was based upon a very narrow fact situation-the
defendants' contact with the forum was limited to the local registration of corporate stock. The defendants were all American citizens, and their contact with the jurisdictional forum was of an
intangible nature.
This Note proposes to examine the nature of United States contacts availed of by foreign defendants,7 and to determine the impact of Shaffer on the potential assertion of quasi-in-remjurisdiction based on those contacts. It is instructive to consider quasi2.

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

3. Id. at 316.
4.
5.
6.
7.
from

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
433 U.S. at 207.
Id.
For the purposes of this Note, a foreign defendant is a nonresident alien
whom the plaintiff has suffered breach of contract or tort damage.
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in-rem jurisdiction's relation to four possible scenarios involving a
foreign defendant: (1) the foreign defendant who owns real estate
in this country; or (2) maintains deposits in United States banks;
or (3) invests in securities that are registered locally; or (4) extends
credit to United States companies or individuals on a regular basis.
This Note ultimately concludes that in light of the narrow fact
situation litigated in Shaffer, the high degree of contacts required
for jurisdiction over an American defendant will necessarily be
lower when determining the due process limitations of quasi-inrem jurisdiction over foreign defendants characterized by the
aforementioned hypothetical scenarios.
II.

QUASI-IN-REM ATTACHMENT AND THE DuE PROCESS SHADOW

A. Legal Background
The doctrine of in rem jurisdiction evolved from the landmark
decision in Pennoyer v. Neff,8 which held that the state had exclusive jurisdiction over all persons and property within its boundaries. While Pennoyer appeared, on its face, to be a tour de force
with respect to jurisdiction over local real estate, the inadequacy
of its precedent with respect to personal jurisdiction became increasingly apparent as Americans became more mobile and interstate commerce bloomed. Since Pennoyer did not distinguish between jurisdiction over property and jurisdiction over persons, a
void developed in that the state courts could assert no power over
persons who were beyond state borders.
Finally, in International Shoe v. Washington,9 the Supreme
Court filled in this jurisdictional void by holding that due process
allowed in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
if he has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' 0 By referring only to in personam jurisdiction, the Court effectively exempted in rem jurisdiction from InternationalShoe's newly announced due process
requirements.

In the years following InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court
regarded due process as requiring a decreasing degree of minimal
contacts in the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, provided "fair
play and substantial justice" was served. In two major decisions,

McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.," and Mullane v. Cen8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. Id. at 316.
11. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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tral Hanover Bank,' 2 the Court satisfied itself that jurisdiction was
fair and just without requiring much more than an ephemeral
degree of defendant-forum contacts. Mullane involved jurisdiction
over unknown, nonresident trust beneficiaries. The Court sustained jurisdiction over these defendants, arguing that New York
State's interest in providing means to close trusts was "so rooted
in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to
determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident
. . . ."13 Later, in McGee, the Court allowed jurisdiction in California over a Texas insurer who did no business within the state
except to the extent that he took over the policies of another insurance company. The Court found that the insurance company had
substantial connection with the California forum, and that the
state had a legitimate interest in regulating insurers who solicited
business in California. 4 Here the Court recognized the importance
of some degree of defendant-forum contacts, yet continued to rely
on state interest as a jurisdictional criterion.
Finally, one year after McGee, the Supreme Court decided
Hanson v. Denckla.15 In Hanson, a Pennsylvania resident established a trust in Delaware and continued, after settling in Florida,
to transmit instructions regarding the trust to the Delaware trustee. Upon the settlor's death, her estate was probated in Florida,
and the local court attempted to obtain jurisdiction over all indispensable parties, including the Delaware trustee. The Supreme
Court refused to allow jurisdiction over the defendant trustee,
holding that in order to fulfill the due process prescription of
InternationalShoe, there must be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of its laws."' 6
As the law of in personam jurisdiction evolved under the guidelines of InternationalShoe, in rem jurisdiction thrived under the
somewhat anachronistic blessing of Pennoyer v. Neff. Ever since
Justice Field observed that a court could not directly affect the
personal interests of the defendant without jurisdiction over his
person," proceedings in rem were viewed as not directly affecting
the personal interests of the owner. It is in this respect that an in
12.

339 U.S. 306 (1950).

13. Id. at 313.
14.
15.
16.
17.

355 U.S. at 223.
357 U.S. at 235 (1958).
Id. at 253.
95 U.S. at 723.
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rem proceeding was to be limited to the value of the property over
which the court had obtained jurisdiction.18
The continuing reluctance of the courts to equate a defendant's
property interests with his personal interests produced a dichotomous precedent whereby the growing reverence for fair play and
substantial justice toward an in personam defendant was abandoned completely when the action was against property in rem.
Nowhere was this dichotomy more threatening than in quasi-inrem actions where the action against property is not direct, but
derivative-the claimant seeks to obtain a judgment against the
property in satisfaction of a different, unrelated claim against the
property's owner.19 In Harris v. Balk,2 ultimately overruled by
Shaffer,21 the defendant owed the plaintiff a sum of money. Both
parties were North Carolina residents. Yet when the defendant
traveled to Maryland, a creditor of the plaintiff served the defendant with a writ of attachment, garnishing his debt to the plaintiff.
When later sued on his debt to the plaintiff, defendant pleaded the
prior Maryland judgment. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled
that the debt had followed the defendant to Maryland where it had
been properly attached. Thus, Harrisstood for the proposition that
even intangible property which was present within a state through
no act of the owner was subject to quasi-in-rem attachment in
satisfaction of an unrelated claim against the owner.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Shaffer, the independent evolution of in rem and in personam jurisdictions had resulted in an illogically disjunctive system of state jurisdictional
power. On one hand, the fair play and substantial justice of
InternationalShoe stood sentinel over assertions of personal jurisdiction. Yet in rem proceedings, typified by Harris v. Balk, were
permitted without any measure of contacts between the defendant,
18. Id. at 725.

19. In rem jurisdiction has developed into three separate categories, generally
known as "true in rem," "quasi-in-rem type I" and "quasi-in-rem type II." True
in rem jurisdiction purports to adjudicate the rights of "all the world" in a designated property, and all claims are decided in a single proceeding. Quasi-in-rem I
also deals with direct claims to specific property, but decides only the claims of
specific parties. Quasi-in-rem II cases involve claims of specific parties to property which are derivative-judgment is sought against property in satisfaction of
a different, unrelated claim against the property's owner. This Note is primarily
concerned with jurisdiction of this nature. 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 87, 95 (1977); see
generally Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L.
REv. 909, 945-66 (1960) (extensively discussing the categories of in rem jurisdiction).
20. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
21. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
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forum and litigation. The Shaffer Court moved decisively to incorporate in in rem jurisdiction the due process requirement of minimal contacts. An examination of Shaffer, though, reveals that it
was based on a fact situation with much potential for differentiation; due process may well require a lower degree of minimal contacts in cases where jurisdiction is maintained for lack of an alternative forum.
B.

Shaffer v. Heitner

Shaffer was based upon a very narrow fact situation. Appellee
Heitner owned one share of stock in Greyhound Corporation, which
was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business
in Arizona. He filed a shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware
against Greyhound, alleging that defendants, twenty-eight present
or former corporate officers or directors, had breached their duties
by conducting unlawful activities in the State of Oregon.2 2 Pursuant to Delaware's sequestration statute, Heitner had 82,000
shares of defendants' Greyhound stock sequestered in order to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction." While the liability of the defendants under quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was limited to the value of
the attached stock, the great value of the property compelled defendants to answer and defend the suit in Delaware. Defendants
challenged the validity of the sequestration statute on constitutional grounds, claiming that defendants lacked sufficient contacts
with the state." The Delaware courts upheld the validity of the
sequestration statute and permitted jurisdiction, noting that the
suit was brought as a quasi-in-rem proceeding and therefore could
be based on the traditional attachment of property, independent
of any possible contacts between the defendant and the forum
state. 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Delaware could not assert jurisdiction over property merely because it
is located within the state; rather, the basis for jurisdiction over
property must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over
the interests of the defendant in that property. 2 Due process requires that in order to assume jurisdiction over these interests,
the court must evaluate the sufficiency of the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum, and determine that they meet the
22. Id. at 189-90.
23.
24.

Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.

25. Id. at 193-95.
26.

Id. at 207.
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minimum contacts standard of InternationalShoe.Y Traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice no longer justify jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property within the sovereignty of the state, unless that presence is indicative of a relationship between the defendant, the forum and the litigation. 8 Justice
Marshall found the Shaffer attachment unconstitutional because
the tenuous relationship between defendant and forum was supported only by local registration of stock, and because the lack of
a forum-litigation relationship was highlighted by the absence of
a cause of action related to the attached property." The Court
further supported its denial of jurisdiction by refuting the argument that treating the presence of property alone as a basis for
jurisdiction would prevent a wrongdoer from removing his property to a forum like Delaware where he is not subject to an in
personam suit.'" Since there was no inquiry as to whether the
defendants actually held property in Delaware for that purpose,
and since judgment in personam could be maintained elsewhere
and enforced under the full faith and credit clause, the Court saw
no reason to allow jurisdiction over the defendants' interest solely
on the basis of the property's presence in Delaware.3' The Court
did note that Shaffer did not raise nor consider the question
"whether the presence of a defendant's property in a state is
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available
to the plaintiff."32
Two concurring opinions in Shaffer suggested the possibility
that certain types of property may provide the contacts necessary
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the state to the extent
27. Id.
28. Id. at 207-09. The Court noted "It would not be fruitful for us to re-

examine the facts of cases decided on the rationalities of Pennoyerand Harris to
determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we
adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled." Id. at 212 n.39.
29. Id. See text discussing unrelated causes of action, infra notes 70-72.
30. Id. at 210.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 211 n.37.
The applicability of this reservation should be limited to suits against defendants whose home countries are too far away and/or whose domestic court system
offers slim prospect of a fair, unbiased adjudication. Lack of alternative forum
cannot be pleaded when the defendant's home is, for instance, Canada. See text
accompanying note 104 infra citing a recent New York state court decision holding courts in Hong Kong and Korea to be acceptable alternate forums. It is not
choice of national law that will determine acceptable forum, rather it is the
practicality of suit and the possibility of a fair trial in a foreign country. See text
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of the value of the property. Justice Powell regarded the ownership
of property of "indisputable" and "permanent" situs as sufficient
to support quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 3 Justice Stevens read into
the Due Process Clause a protection against "judgments without
notice."3 The requirement of fair notice would include a fair
warning that "a particular activity may subject a person to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."" Justice Stevens opined that
the purchase of real estate or the opening of a bank account are
contacts, though minimal, that gave rise to predictable risks; even
the purchase of intangible property, like stock, may represent a
calculated risk to a foreign investor, since a foreign investment
"[a]s a matter of international law. . . is sufficiently unusual to
make it appropriate to require the investor to study the ramifications of his decision." 36
1IT.

ANALYSIS OF SHAFFER IN FOREIGN Busmnass ASSETS CONTEXT
A.

Defendant-Forum Relationship
1.

Purposeful Acts

In the realm of defendant-forum contacts, the narrow fact situation considered in Shaffer renders the case highly suitable for future differentiation. Jurisdiction over the defendant was based
merely on the registration of his Greyhound stock in the state of
Delaware." Surely, the Court recognized that, in Shaffer, it was
addressing the most tenuous of defendant-forum contacts. 8 Given
the possibility that our prospective plaintiff seeks to attach real
estate, bank deposits, stock or credit, belonging to a foreign defendant, the question arises whether such defendant-forum contacts
are sufficient to support the acquisition of jurisdiction under the
due process guidelines of Shaffer.
accompanying note 103 infra, citing a Connecticut Federal District Court holding
that a trial under Islamic law in Kuwait would not provide the plaintiff with a
reasonably alternative forum. Equally important in the due process analysis is the
historical ability of the plaintiff to pursue claims in foreign lands. A large Am-

erican multinational ought to consider many western-style countries as readily
accessable fora, whereas a denial of local jurisdiction would prejudice the more

common businessman who lacked an international presence.
33. Id. at 217.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 218.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 191-92.

38. "Appellee Heitner did not allege and does not now claim that appellants
have ever set foot in Delaware. Nor does he identify any act related to his cause
of action as having taken place in Delaware." Id. at 213.
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The Supreme Court now requires the suitor to look beyond the
early guidelines of InternationalShoe, which simply required
"minimum contacts"3 9 with the forum such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." 0 Justice Marshall had Hanson v. Denckla in
mind when he noted that, in Shaffer, the defendant had never been
in the forum state. The Hanson Court required that in order for
jurisdiction to be permissible "it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."4 By emphasizing
"an act of purposeful availment," Hanson manifested a shift in
emphasis from the earlier decision of McGee v. InternationalLife
Insurance Co., in which the Court reasoned that it would be fair
to subject a party to jurisdiction when it was convenient for him
to appear 2 and when there exists the requisite InternationalShoe
standard of contacts.4 3 The Shaffer Court rejects the notion of convenience as a basis for jurisdiction, 44 and reaffirms the requirement
of purposeful acts which avail the defendant of the benefits of the
forum state. 45 Recently, the Supreme Court reversed the holding
of the California Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court of
California,46 which had allowed California jurisdiction over a New
York father who allowed his daughter to go live in California with
her recently divorced mother. The Court held that the test of measuring the "effects" in California caused by a nonresident defendant was insufficient to determine jurisdiction without the requirement of a purposeful act by a defendant intending to avail himself
47
of the state's benefits.
Of the four proposed scenarios, it is likely that a purchase of land
or an opening of a bank account by a foreign, or even domestic,
defendant will constitute actual acts committed within the state.
The purchase of American securities, though, may not lend itself
well to the definition of an act. Certainly the Shaffer Court saw
39. 326 U.S. at 316.
40. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463).
41. 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added) (cited in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216).
42. 355 U.S. at 223.
43. Id. at 222.
44. 433 U.S. at 215.
45. Id. at 216.
46. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
47. Id. at 96-97. But cf. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969), which relied heavily upon the defendant's
enjoyment of the state's benefits to show purposeful availment, but drew upon
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no act inherent in the purchase of stock registered in Delaware.
In view of the recognition given by Justice Stevens to foreign
investment in American securities,"8 however, such purchases
by foreign defendants could at least qualify as constructive acts
committed within American jurisdiction.
Finally, a foreign defendant's extension of credit to domestic
parties may demand the most liberal recognition as a constructive
act within our jurisdiction. To avoid the unfairness of attaching
transitory Haris v. Balk type debts, courts may permit attachment
of debt only when it is extended to an entity permanently located
within United States jurisdiction. Similarly, a loan to the home
office of a United States multinational corporation may qualify for
attachment, while a loan to its foreign subsidiary may not.
Particular attention must be paid to Justice Marshall's footnoted caveat that plaintiff's lack of alternative forum may render
a due process equilibrium requiring less than the International
Shoe degree of contacts. 9 Since this Note's scenarios involve foreign defendants who are not easily sued overseas, it follows that
the Shaffer footnote would sanction a lower actual degree of
defendant-forum or forum-litigation contacts in the due process
analysis of jurisdiction."° This approach provides further support
in the foregoing analysis for the generous recognition of constructive acts as a basis for finding a defendant-forum relationship.
2.

Purposeful Availment of Forum Benefits

In addition to proving an act committed within the forum state,
plaintiff must show that the defendant purposely availed himself
of the benefits of the forum. 5 The concept of foreseeability may be
used to establish purposefulness once an act has been revealed.
Justice Marshall alluded to this concept in Shaffer, when he
pointed out that the defendant "had no reason to expect to be
hauled before a Delaware court." 52 Later, in Kulko, Justice Marshall dismissed the "effects" doctrine not only as an inadequate
substitute for an in-state act, but also inadequate to show a purthe "effects" fiction as a substitute for an act within the state. Shaffer and Kulko
imply that they will require stronger evidence of an act within the state.

48. 433 U.S. at 218.
49. Id. at 211 n.37.
50. See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra, concerning the continued vitality of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and an allowance of a lower requisite degree of
contacts in the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.

51.

433 U.S. at 216.

52. Id.
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poseful availment of benefits." The California effects doctrine
must be distinguished from the "foreseeability" doctrine, however,
in that "effects" within a forum are objective foregone conclusions,
whereas foreseeability of forum benefits signals that a conscious
choice has been made by the defendant before he acted. Thus, the
Court in Kulko would agree with Shaffer's implied recognition of
foreseeability as a basis for finding a purposeful availment of
forum benefits.
Our prospective plaintiff must consider whether the foreign defendant has availed himself of the forum state's benefits by purchasing land, holding bank accounts, investing in stock registered
in the state, or extending credit. In his concurring opinion in
Shaffer, Justice Stevens implicitly equated assumption of risk of
suit with purposeful availment of forum benefits: "If I visit another
state, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the state will exercise its power over
my property or my person while there. My contact with the state,
though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks." 54 Therefore, the
question arises as to whether our prospective defendant would
have assumed the risk of being sued in a particular forum state
only by virtue of land or bank holdings, or whether the same consequence can flow from the purchase of stock or the extension of a
loan to a corporation organized under the laws of the forum state.
Justice Stevens distinguishes the attachment of securities owned
by a foreign defendant "because a foreign investment is sufficiently unusual to make it appropriate to require the investor to
study the ramifications of his decision . .

.

. [A] purchase of

securities in the domestic market is an entirely different matter.""5
Lower courts have justified the finding of defendant-forum contacts through the concept of foreseeability suggested in Shaffer. In
EngineeringEquipment Co. v. S.S. "Selene,-"5 a case of maritime
attachment, the court stated:
53. 436 U.S. at 93-96.
54. 433 U.S. at 218. Justice Powell's concurring opinion suggests the same
result:
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on whether the ownership
of some forms of property whose situs is indisputedly and permanently
located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the
value of the property.
Id. at 217.
55. Id. at 218.
56. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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[E]ven after Shaffer, the presence of the defendants' property
can provide a basis for jurisdiction. The presence of the debt in the
U.S. is by no means fortuitous. It arises out of charter parties that
the defendants executed with American companies and that contemplated at least partial performance within the U.S. The defendants could reasonably have foreseen that litigation relating to these
contacts could take place in the U.S. 57
In an earlier decision, Federv. Turkish Airlines,58 the court interpreted the foreseeability language of Shaffer "as requiring minimal
contacts between the defendant and the forum relative to the property attached . . . transitory contacts unrelated to the property
simply would not put a nonresident defendant on notice of the
possibility of his having to defend certain property in the forum." 59
One year later, the Second Circuit, in Intermeat v. American
Poultry, Inc.," effectively dismissed Feder's limitation that only
property-related contacts could be considered when evaluating the
sufficiency of defendant-forum contacts. Circuit Judge Gurfein
found that Shaffer's requirement of minimum contacts "means
that the presence of the defendant's property within [the state]
must be viewed as only one contact of the defendant with the state,
to be considered along with other contacts in deciding whether the
assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."''
It is likely that the foreign defendant would be found to have
committed purposeful acts to avail himself of forum benefits by
purchasing real estate or holding bank accounts. Although Justice
Stevens has suggested that foreign investment be deemed purposeful availment of forum benefits, the essential Hanson requirement
of an "act" within the forum may be lacking in the case of-locally
registered stock. A possible solution to this dilemma would be the
Intermeat analysis, which would allow the consideration of other
forum contacts, if they exist, in addition to the contact through the
stock registration." The sum of these defendant-forum contacts
may be held, in the case of a foreign investor, to be sufficient to
permit the acquisition of jurisdiction over the foreign defendant's
interest in the property. A consideration of other forum contacts
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 1279 n.5.
575 F.2d 1017 (2nd Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1022 (citing 326 U.S. at 316).
See text accompanying note 119 infra.
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may well support the attachment of debt, also. A showing that the
foreign defendant regularly extended credit to a domestic party
signifies an availment of the benefits of the jurisdiction where the
party is located. In Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 3 the
court relied on Justice Stevens' reasoning in Shaffer that the activity of the defendant had given it "fair warning" that it may be
subject to suit somewhere in the United States. The court found
that "[bly transacting business with the garnishee, defendant
plainly took the risk that debts owed the defendant by the garnishee might provide the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction." 4
Shaffer's insistence upon using the same test of fair play and
substantial justice in in rem actions as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam does not preclude the possibility of requiring
a lower degree of forum contacts in a quasi-in-rem attachment of
a foreigner's property. 5 The vitality of the quasi-in-rem action
should be preserved for those instances where the foreigner's only
contacts with the United States are through his investment and
risk in holding property within our jurisdiction. This extension of
the foreigner's risk should not necessarily be indicative of contacts
sufficient to warrant in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer denigrated
the argument that the potential liability of a defendant in quasiin-rem actions is limited by the size of the claim being litigated.66
This scorn, however, should be confined and directed at the attempted assertion of jurisdiction over property solely because the
value of the property is relatively small. Such an attempt at attachment should be rebuffed because it disregards the possibility
of in personam jurisdiction in another forum.6 7 The real merit in
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction appears when the defendant-forum contacts in the property, albeit tenuous, represent the total risk taken
by a foreign defendant within this country. What should be
stressed about quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in this situation is that it
contemplates jurisdiction only to the extent of the foreigner's risk,
not merely to the extent of his property value. By focusing on the
defendant's contacts with the forum, and by regarding property
63. 455 F. Supp. 630 (D.Conn. 1977).
64. Id. at 633.
65. See 433 U.S. at 211 n.37; see also Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End
of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 74-77 (1978) for a discussion of the possibility of
a lower degree of contacts in quasi-in-rem jurisdiction than in in personam jurisdiction.
66. 433 U.S. at 207 n.23.
67. Id. at 209 n.32.
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holdings as calculated risks, the unfairness in trying to justify
jurisdiction over property solely because that property is not of
great value, disappears.
B.

Forum Litigation Relationship
1.

Introduction

Shaffer's insistence upon "ties among the defendant, the State,
and the litigation,"" dictates that jurisdiction must be supported
by not only defendant-forum contacts, but contacts between the
forum and the litigation as well. Justice Marshall referred explicitly to the fact that Shaffer will profoundly affect cases "where the
property which now serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action."6 9 It should be
recognized, however, that in light of Shaffer's consideration of a
minimum defendant-forum contacts fact situation, and in light of
its adherence to the formula outlined in the minimum contacts
holding of International Shoe,70 the requirement that a cause of
action be related to defendant-forum contacts should be limited to
cases in which the defendant-forum contacts are indeed minimal.
While it is unlikely that our foreign defendant's contacts with the
forum will amount to anything more than minimal, the plaintiff
should note that in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,"7 the
Court held that state courts could exercise jurisdiction on causes
of action not arising from contacts within the state when the defendant's contacts within the state were "continuous and systematic," rather than minimal. "Continuous and systematic,"
though, evidences a level of contacts which would certainly entitle
the plaintiff to in personamjurisdiction over the foreign defendant,
thus obviating the need for jurisdiction through attachment.
In its refusal to require that property attached be related to the
plaintiff's cause of action, the court in Feder v. Turkish Airlines3
ignored the fact that Perkins was limited to situations where the
defendant-forum contacts were substantial. In finding that there
was "no express 'holding' in Shaffer that required a cause of
action related to defendant-forum contacts, the Feder court relied
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 209.
Id.
326 U.S. at 319.
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Id. at 438.
441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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on the fact that Shaffer had not ruled on bank accounts as potential forum contacts. 7 While it may be found, for instance, that
holding bank accounts represents a more purposeful availment of
forum benefits than buying stock registered in the forum state,
both acts will be ranked, at most, as minimal defendant-forum
contacts. Perkins' allowance of a cause of action unrelated to those
defendant-forum contacts should be of no avail when the contacts
are minimal, as opposed to continuous and systematic.
2.

State Interest Doctrine

Since it seems relatively easy for the plaintiff to show that the
foreign defendant has assumed some degree of minimum contacts
with the forum, the most pressing question surfacing in Shaffer's
wake is how to prove a relationship between the forum and the
litigation.
In the past, considerable weight has been placed upon the interests of the state as a criterion for determining jurisdiction to adjudicate. Recent decisions support the proposition that state interest
can, in the quest for jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, be substituted for the related cause of action in order to provide the
forum-litigation relationship.
An analysis of the state interest doctrine reveals that Shaffer
does indeed indicate a shift in emphasis away from the importance
of state interest as a basis for jurisdiction. In the early decision of
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank,75 the Court relied most heavily
on New York's interest in closing trusts, and allowed jurisdiction
without emphasizing the consideration of fairness to the parties."
Later, in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,77 the Court
again placed considerable weight upon the interests of the state in
providing jurisdiction over insurers: "It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of re74. Id. at 1278.
75. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
76. The Court stated:
[T]he interest of each State in providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its
courts is -so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the
right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and
be heard.
Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
77. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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dress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. 7' 8
In 1958, the Supreme Court was faced with the argument that
application of state law was a state interest sufficiently important
to require state court jurisdiction. The Court in Hanson v.
7
Denckla,'
found that choice of law or choice of convenient location
were not state interests worthy of consideration as jurisdictional
criteria. 0
Shaffer's approach to the state interest doctrine as a criterion in
determining jurisdiction to adjudicate appears contradictory on its
face. In an early part of the opinion, Justice Marshall notes that
the "[s]tate's strong interest in assuring the marketability of
property within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property""'
would support the exercise of state court jurisdiction. Yet later, the
Court became influenced by its Hanson opinion and went so far as
to treat state interest solely as a choice of law criterion:
[E]ven if Heitner's assessment of the importance of Delaware's
interest is accepted, his argument fails to demonstrate that Delaware is a fair forum for this litigation. The interest appellee has
identified may support the application of Delaware law to resolve
any controversy over appellants' actions in their capacities as officers and directors. But we have rejected the argument that if a
State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute.2
Shaffer went on to cite directly from Hanson with regard to state
interest as a jurisdictional criterion:
[The State] does not acquire . . .jurisdiction by being the

"center of gravity" of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of
law. It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the
[appellants] ."

Never before has the Court given so little weight to a state's
interest in assuming jurisdiction. 84 In light of Shaffer's brief recog78. Id. at 223. For earlier cases stressing state interest, see Henry L. Doherty

& Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

355 U.S. at 223.
Id. at 254.
433 U.S. at 208.
433 U.S. at 215.
Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 254).
Justice Brennan stated in the dissenting portion of his opinion that the
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nition of state interest as a jurisdictional criterion, however, it
should not be interpreted as a complete abdication of the state
interest doctrine. Rather, this opinion holds that state interest is
of limited importance in determining the fairness of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff must ascertain the newly determined applicability
of state interest as a basis for jurisdiction. Shaffer's reliance on
Hanson's language to categorize state interest as a choice of law
question is merely an awkward vehicle for holding that state interest alone will no longer be sufficient to render jurisdiction over a
defendant who has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting affairs within the forum state." Since it is likely that
the foreign defendant will be considered to have purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of the forum state through the four
hypothetical scenarios, state interest might ultimately be used by
the plaintiff as a valid basis for the assumption of jurisdiction. As
the plaintiff would be asserting a cause of action unrelated to the
forum contacts of the defendant, the state interest claimed by the
plaintiff must provide the essential link in the InternationalShoe
requirement of a forum-litigation relationship.
Shaffer provides a hint of this special state interest in its reference to the "[sitate's strong interest in assuring the marketability
of property within its borders."8 Realizing that it was frequently
inadequate to base in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction upon the
fiction that anyone claiming property within a state availed himself of forum benefits, 7 the Court utilized the concept of state's
interest in marketability of land as additional justification for the
exercise of jurisdiction in cases where the defendant held property
within the state, and was not amenable to suit in other forums.88
Shaffer's approval of the state interest doctrine is thus limited to
cases of "jurisdiction by necessity," 89 in which the ultimate consideration is to provide the plaintiff with at least one possible forum
Court's earlier decisions in this area, i.e. Mullane and McGee, "establish that the
State's valid substantive interests are important considerations in assessing
whether it constitutionally may claim jurisdiction over a given cause of action."
Id. at 222-23. He went on to recognize, however, "that Delaware's varied interests
would [not] justify its acceptance of jurisdiction over any transaction touching
upon the affairs of its domestic corporations." Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 214-16.
86. See note 81 supra.
87. Such is the case in the event of fraud, or improper removal of property.
88. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. See also Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1173-74 (1966).
89.

11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 116 n.176.
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for his litigation. The same policy was at work in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, in which there would have been no means to
close a New York trust if the New York forum had not been available to the plaintiffs. 0 Indicating its desire to provide at least one
forum for the litigation, the Court stated that: "[a] construction
of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified.""'
A plaintiff suing the alien defendant will probably find that the
only contacts between the alien and a U.S. forum are property
holdings. Since Justice Marshall had contemplated the possibility
of the plaintiff obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant
in an alternate forum,92 the plaintiff's inability to do so will place
his case beyond the usual applicability of Shaffer. Citing the forbidding cost and inevitable prejudice encountered in filing suit in
a foreign land, the plaintiff may rightly move for the assumption
of "jurisdiction by necessity."
It must be noted, however, that both Shaffer and Mullane recognize state interests enhanced by the fact that the cause of action
is related to the contacts of the defendant with the forum. 3 Therefore the question of whether "jurisdiction by necessity" should
only be allowed when there is a cause of action related to the
defendant's forum contacts must be addressed. The answer is
clearly negative. Shaffer, in dealing with true in rem cases, had the
opportunity to rely on the fact that these traditional forms of jurisdiction satisfied the forum-litigation relationship requirement
since they already contemplated a cause of action based on
defendant-forum contacts. In a decision that spared no effort to
deprecate state interest as a jurisdictional criterion, however, the
Court went ahead and asserted that the state's interest in marketability of land would help satisfy the requirement of a defendantforum relationship. This reference should signal the reader that the
90. 339 U.S. at 313.
91. 339 U.S. at 313-14. It should be noted that while Mullane dealt with
procedural due process notice requirements, the controversy in Shaffer was
whether the ultimate assumption of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction violated substantive due process. Since both cases address the issue of due process standards for
jurisdiction, however, extenuating circumstances like "necessity" should support

jurisdiction in Shaffer as well as Mullane.
92. In reference to enforcing judgment against defendant's assets, the Court
stated: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in personam

judgment of one State enforceable in all other States." 433 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct.
at 2583.
93. This is quasi-in-rem type I. See note 19 supra.
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Court was contemplating exigencies when, in order to secure for
the plaintiff the only available forum for jurisdiction, it would
allow state interest to play a role. If this interest in "jurisdiction
by necessity" can fill the gap left by possibly inadequate
defendant-forum contacts,94 there is no reason why state interest
alone can't suffice as a forum-litigation relationship, without the
aid of a cause of action related to defendant-forum contacts, when
no alternative forum is available to the plaintiff.
Only eight years before Shaffer, the Supreme Court, in Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,95 recognized the importance of according
the "creditor interest" "special protection" in "extraordinary situations."9 Although this decision dealt with the due process limitation of prehearing attachment, the same due process construction
ought to prevail where the creditor seeks to establish jurisdiction
by attachment. By reading Shaffer together with Sniadach's noted
protection of creditors, future courts should recognize that
"jurisdiction by necessity" must apply to all creditors, not merely
to those who seek to attach property that is related to the underlying cause of action. If Sniadach's protection of creditors is to be
extended fairly to those plaintiffs who lack alternative forums,
then Shaffer should allow the attachment of property unrelated to
the underlying cause of action, as long as the property indicates
sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum."
Recent decisions indicate that jurisdiction after Shaffer will be
predicated upon defendant's contacts with "the State of the forum
as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
94. See note 87 supra.
95. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
96. 395 U.S. at 339.
97. The Court left open the question whether the presence of defendant's
property would support jurisdiction if no other forum were available. 433 U.S. at
211 n.37. If "jurisdiction by necessity" were substituted entirely for a cause of
action related to defendant-forum contacts, we might expect that due process
would require that the property represent some degree of contact between the
defendant and the forum. Land holdings or bank accounts may be considered
purposeful risks by the foreign defendant; perhaps future courts will heed Justice
Stevens' suggestion that foreign owned securities also represent calculated risks
in a particular forum.
In the event that certain property is not considered representative of minimum
defendant-forum contacts, it is suggested that the state of the plaintiff's residence
should assert jurisdiction because this would be more reasonable than an assertion of jurisdiction based on the fortuitous location of the defendant's property
within the forum. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 668, 681-82 (1975).
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government, to require the [defendant] to defend the particular
suit which is brought there."98 In Kulko, Justice Marshall was
careful to point out that the plaintiff was not at a "severe disadvantage," because, after all, she could secure inpersonamjurisdiction over the defendant in another forum, and, if necessary, bring
execution proceedings through the uniform enforcement acts.9
In a case involving the garnishment of a debt owed to a Kuwaiti
defendant, the District Court of Connecticut ruled that jurisdiction by necessity was indeed necessary where the defendant was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the fifty states. Louring v.
Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co.'"° involved a plaintiff who was a
Connecticut citizen and a defendant corporation organized and
existing under the laws of Kuwait. The court noted that "Shaffer
explicitly left open the question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a state is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction 'when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff."'' 10' It further recognized that Shaffer's rationale supported only application of the
InternationalShoe minimum contacts test to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction because an in personam judgment could be secured "in
a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with
InternationalShoe."' 2 The state in which the property was located
would then be obliged to honor such a judgment under the full
faith and credit clause.
In Louring, however, the defendant made no claim that it was
subject to jurisdiction in some state other than Connecticut. There
would be no possibility for the plaintiff to secure an in personam
judgment in any state of the union. The court found that the
InternationalShoe minimum contacts test in Shaffer could not be
demanded of a plaintiff if the only possibility of an in personam
judgment was in a foreign land. Plaintiffs simply would not be able
to obtain suitable legal redress in Kuwait under Islamic law there
in force,'0 3 nor be able to conduct a fair proceeding due to the
overwhelming costs of a foreign trial.' 4
98. 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added) (cited in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203).
99. 436 U.S. at 100, 100 n.15.
100. 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977).
101. Id. at 633 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37).
102. 433 U.S. at 210.
103. Plaintiff's reply letter to Judge Newman, July 19, 1977, Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977).
104. But see Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Company, Ltd., New York
County, Supreme Court, New York Law Journal, p. 1-2, Aug. 1, 1978, where the
court addressed the plaintiff's claim that no other forum was available for its
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The Louring case is a classic example of a foreign defendant
being called into a state to defend to the extent that it willingly
exposed itself to suit. Shaffer requires minimal defendant-forum
contacts and minimum forum-litigation contacts-Louring clearly
0 5 It was
satisfied the former."
the need to provide plaintiff with a
practical forum for suit that provided the relationship between the
forum and the litigation. The court impliedly recognized that there
was no need for the attached property to be related to the underlying cause of action in the event that plaintiff had no alternative
forum to sue the defendant.
The conclusion to be reached from the foregoing analysis is that
state interest should be used to support the assertion of jurisdiction
by necessity. Shaffer's express recognition of state interest was
unfortunately directed to the sufficiency of real estate holding as
a suitable defendant-forum relationship. Such unique edification
by state judicial fiat of land-holding as evidence of a higher degree
of defendant-forum contacts may face constitutional challenge as
a denial of equal protection to landowners.'"8
The use of state interest should be restricted to its real qualification in Mullane and Shaffer-an interest of the state in providing
jurisdiction when no alternative exists. This interest evinces the
forum-litigation relationship, and it should apply to all types of
property, not just real estate. As is evidenced by the Shaffer footnote, state interest in "jurisdiction by necessity" may bear on the
fairness of an assertion of jurisdiction-yet not, of itself, create
contacts between the defendant and forum.'
While state interest does not create defendant-forum contacts,
it does, however, provide the relationship between the forum and
the litigation-jurisdiction by necessity should be allowed within
the state after judicial determination that no alternative forum is
open to the plaintiff.
C. Advantageous Aspects of Federal Court Jurisdiction
There is considerable support for the proposition that a plaintiff
suing a foreign defendant would fare better in federal, rather than
complaint by pointing out that "the courts of Hong Kong and Korea can provide
redress for the claims asserted."
105. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
106. See Slomanson, Real Property Unrelated to the Claim: Due Process for
Quasi-in-rem Jurisdiction?,83 Dick. 60, 60 n.73 (1978).
107. See Note, The Expanded Scope of the Sufficient Minimum Contacts
Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 504, 521 (1977).
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state, court. Indeed, in applying or distinguishing the Shaffer case,
it is both instructive and necessary to translate its treatment of the
state jurisdiction question into federal terms.
It is apparent that the strict guidelines for minimum contacts
analysis found in Shaffer apply only in the context of an
InternationalShoe exercise of state court jurisdiction. Justice
Stewart made repeated references to the InternationalShoe standard, but only in terms directed towards the potential assertion of
state jurisdictional power. "[A]lthough the presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties
among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence
08
of the property alone would not support the State'sjurisdiction."'
InternationalShoe and its progeny were concerned with the constitutional limitations, under the fourteenth amendment, on the
exercise of the power inherent in the sovereignty of the several
states. The plaintiff will benefit from the fact that assertions of
federal jurisdiction must be analyzed under the fifth amendment.
Before distinguishing a fifth amendment analysis of minimum
contacts with that of the fourteenth amendment, it is important
for the plaintiff to recognize that since he is suing a foreign defendant on the basis of property attached in the United States, the
constitutional grant of foreign commerce power"0 9 to the federal
government may serve to distinguish the due process limitations
of attaching a foreigner's property as opposed to attaching the
property of a resident who can be sued in another United States
forum.
While Congress has not given exclusive jurisdiction over foreign
commerce actions to the federal courts as it has done over admiralty suits,"' plaintiff could be faced with a reluctance on the part
of a state court judge to rule in favor of attachment for fear that
the state would be intruding on or misconstruing the federal foreign commerce power. A ruling in federal court may be more favorable to the plaintiff because the judge would not feel that he is
asserting the power of a jurisdiction that did not have foreign commerce power.
Plaintiff should also draw analogy to the arguments made in
admiralty suits'" concerning the inapplicability of Shaffer stan108.

433 U.S. at 209, 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (emphasis added).

109.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8.

110. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 76.
111. See Grand Bahama Pet. Co. v. Canadian Transp., 450 F. Supp. 447, 453
(W.D. Wash. 1978).
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dards in areas of law that require special protection for the injured
party. Although admiralty suits are distinguished by special constitutional recognition of the exigencies of maritime law, the same
allowances should inure to the plaintiff who must sue a foreign
defendant and can practically reach only the property attachable
in the United States. Future decisions may hold, as did Re Louisville Underwriters,"2 in admiralty, that "[t]o compel suitors...
to resort to the home of the defendant, and to prevent them from
suing him in any district in which. . his goods or credits [may
be] attached, would not only often put them to great delay, inconvenience and expense, but would in many cases amount to a denial
113
of justice.
The considerations involved in attaching the property of a foreign defendant are indeed more far-reaching than those inherent
in the fourteenth amendment analysis of Shaffer. The greatest
benefit accruing to a plaintiff who proceeds in federal court will
ultimately be the fact that his proposed attachment of the foreigner's property will be limited by the due process guidelines of
the fifth, rather than the fourteenth amendment.
Several courts have accepted the argument that when a foreign
defendant is being sued in federal court on the basis of federal law,
the fifth amendment will allow the aggregation of defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole in determining the constitutional propriety of jurisdiction.1 In Edward J. Moriarty & Co.
v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 115 a seminal case, the court commented that measuring national contacts was particularly appropriate when enforcing federal law, since uniformity in enforcing
federal rights should be the true guideline. The benefits to the
plaintiff of obtaining a fifth amendment aggregation analysis are
obvious. It increases the total number of defendant-forum contacts
to be considered as a basis for the required defendant-forum relationship. Also, there is a greater possibility of having the plaintiff's
cause of action arise from those defendant-forum contacts, thus
112. 134 U.S. 488 (1890).
113. Id. at 493.
114. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1977); Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975);
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Cryomedics v. Spembly, 397 F. Supp. 287, 290-92 (D. Conn. 1975); Edward J.
Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
115. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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providing the traditional type of forum-litigation relationship most
desired by courts adhering to the strict guidelines of Shaffer. Indeed, the possibility of aggregation of defendant's United States
contacts conforms best with the nature of a suit against a foreign
defendant whose contacts with the various states may be at most
transient, but no doubt beneficial and effective. "8 In Cryomedics
v. Spembly, 7 the court held that it would be inappropriate not to
consider the foreigner's contacts with the entire nation: "Due process or traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
should not immunize an alien defendant from suit in the United
the
States simply because each state makes up only a fraction of
8
product.""
offending
the
for
market
substantial nationwide
In applying the aggregation concept to the quasi-in-rem method
of acquiring jurisdiction, plaintiff should be able to attach the
foreign defendant's property and assert that it is merely one of his
many contacts with the United States as a whole. Since
Intermeat"I allowed attached property to represent the remainder
of a resident defendant's contacts with a state forum, it follows
that the same reasoning would allow attached property to provide
jurisdiction as representative of a foreign defendant's total contact
with the United States. If the defendant's contacts with the United
States are sufficient to satisfy the fairness standard of the fifth
amendment, then the only limitation on place of trial would be the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 2
Plaintiff may very likely face a situation in which he is attempting to sue the alien defendant in federal court, but must maintain
diversity jurisdiction instead of jurisdiction based upon a federal
cause of action. Without jurisdiction based upon a federal question, the argument for a uniform application of federal law disappears. It could be argued that since state law will ultimately be
116. Once jurisdiction in a United States court is deemed fair and just, the
alien can rarely prefer one district court over another. Since it is not fundamentally unfair to ask a Kuwaiti defendant to defend in Illinois as opposed to New
York, any such preference on the part of the alien "will seldom rise to the level
of a constitutional objection to jurisdiction and is more properly vindicated by a
transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), rather than by a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction." 446 F. Supp. at 710.
117. 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1975).
118. Id. at 291 (citing Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F.
Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973)).
119. See note 60 supra.
120. Cf. Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene, supra note 92, at 710;
Holf v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
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applied, there will no longer be any justification for the court to
measure defendant's contacts with the nation as a whole.
There is, however, a stronger argument for the application of the
fifth amendment aggregation theory even to diversity cases in federal court. In Moriarty,'21 the court argued that it is not the territory in which a court sits that determines the extent of its jurisdiction, but rather the geographical limits of the unit of government
of which the court is a part. Therefore, it follows that since it is a
federal court that is asserting its power over a foreign defendant,
contacts with the geographical limits of the federal government
should be measured as a basis for allowing jurisdiction. Even in
Shaffer, the Court noted that restrictions on state court jurisdiction are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
state.' 22 The Court's reference to the power of the state implies that
jurisdiction based upon the power of the federal court should be
limited by the constitutional amendment designed to check federal

power. 123
121.

381 F. Supp. at 390.

122. 433 U.S. at 204 n.20. See also Green, FederalJurisdictionIn Personam
of Corporationsand Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REv. 967, 986 (1961).
123. The application of the fifth, as opposed to the fourteenth, amendment
standards to establish due process limitations on jurisdiction should be distinguished from the choice between state and federal law in interpreting the applicability of the quasi-in-rem statute. It is accepted that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require, in Rule 4(e), that attachment be effected in the manner provided by state law in both diversity and federal law jurisdiction cases. Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1075.
Of course, quasi-in-rem attachment may be provided for in a special manner
or prohibited entirely under certain federal or state statutes. For instance, the
recent Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act specifically prohibits the use of quasiin-rem attachment as a means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state. 28
U.S.C. § 1610(d) (2) (1976).
Plaintiff will find this Note's discussion of the due process limitations on quasiin-rem jurisdiction irrelevant if and when it is ascertained that neither federal nor
state law has provided statutory authority for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. This
unfortunate possibility will not support a plea for jurisdiction by necessity; the
Shaffer footnote only suggested that due process would allow quasi-in-remjurisdiction, if necessary, but not in absence of or in contravention of applicable state
statutes. A recent critic of jurisdiction by necessity misleadingly erected a strawman argument suggesting that an absence of statutory authority for quasi-in-rem
attachment or long-arm service evidences "the determination of the forum state
that the defendant should not be subject to such process." See Slomanson,
supra note 106, at 62-63. Such reasoning is pedestrian, and ought not to militate
against the due process criteria for allowing jurisdiction by necessity, i.e., obstacles precluding pursuit of an overseas adjudication and/or a biased foreign court.
See note 32 supra.
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Equal Protection Challenge

Although Shaffer deals directly with the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, an assertion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based upon the classification of the defendant as an alien will
necessarily raise the question of equal protection. 4
In Graham v. Richardson,25 the Supreme Court declared the
classification of aliens a suspect category, and held that lawfully
admitted resident aliens, as well as citizens of the United States,
are entitled to equal protection of the laws of the state [a fourteenth amendment context] in which they reside.1 2 1 Under our
hypothetical, however, the plaintiff would be suing a nonresident
alien against whom jurisdiction must be asserted quasi-in-rem in2
stead of in personam.
With regard to nonresident aliens, some courts have ruled that
when such persons are beyond the jurisdiction of the United
States, the fourteenth amendment, by its own terms, does not
protect them.'2 This reasoning seems to be limited to cases in
which the nonresident alien is being excluded from the United
States or prevented from acquiring land therein. 2 There appears
to be an allowance of equal protection to those nonresident aliens
124. Even in federal court, the concept of equal protection should prevail, in
spite of the fact that the fifth amendment lacks an equal protection clause. In
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court recognized that:
[tihe Fifth Amendment ...

does not contain an equal protection clause

as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied only to the states. But
the concepts of equal protection and due process both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than
"due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are
always interchangeable phrases. But ... discrimination may be so unjustified as to be violative of due process.
Id. at 499.
125. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
126. Id. at 371.
127. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra concerning the continued vitality of the quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
128. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir. 1975). Contra, United States v. Pink, 317 U.S.
203 (1942); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Sardino
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898
(1966).
129. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945); San Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745, 749 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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who have already obtained property and are making an appearance on American territory in order to defend their investment

rights. 130
While it appears that nonresident aliens whose property is attached in the United States will be accorded equal protection, it
is unlikely that this protection will arise to the strict scrutiny demanded by Graham for resident aliens. Ln light of the residentnonresident alien dichotomy in applying equal protection to aliens, 31 plaintiff may only be required to show a reasonable basis
for allowing the attachment of an alien's property in the assertion
of "jurisdiction by necessity." The impossibility or impracticability of acquiring jurisdiction over a distant and unreachable alien
should easily provide the reasonable basis for such classifications.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The holding in Shaffer v. Heitner should have only limited
practical implications for the American plaintiff attempting to
obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. While
Shaffer does demand relationships between defendant and forum,
and between forum and litigation, the threshold degree of contacts
required to achieve those relationships is lower when dealing with
the property of a foreign defendant. As Justice Stevens noted in
his concurrence, the presence of property, even the registration of
securities, in the United States may be considered a level of calculated risk undertaken by a foreigner that would indicate 32a sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum.
The relationship between the forum and the litigation need not
be supported by the fact that the attached property is related to
the underlying cause of action. Shaffer leaves sufficient margin for
state interest to play a role in supporting a forum-litigation relationship when the plaintiff is attempting to attach property of a
foreigner who cannot be sued in personam in any other practical
33
forum.
The prospective plaintiff should note that a suit in federal court
may be more auspicious since it would be possible to consider the
aggregate of the foreigner's total United States contacts when de130. See Shames v. Nebraska, 408 U.S. 901 (1971); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923).
131. See 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 491, 513 (1976).
132. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 75-107 supra.
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termining the fairness of federal jurisdiction.'34
Future interpretations of Shaffer will have considerable bearing
on the course of international business and foreign direct investment. Foreigners may decelerate their investments in the United
States if they fear expensive litigation unrelated to their investment interest. On the other hand, business transactions and relationships with foreign concerns may suffer if the American plaintiff
cannot obtain a convenient and practical forum in which to maintain suit. Shaffer's recognition of the need to provide the plaintiff
with a forum coupled with the calculated relationship of a foreign
investor with the American forum, will support future assertions
of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the foreigner's interest in local
property.
Steven HarlanBecker
134.

See text accompanying notes 108-23 supra.

